Publication Date : 28-03-2013
In the current climate of unrest in Bangladesh, we should all be concerned about how police activities are investigated in the country. There are a disturbing number of recent cases which raise questions about whether the Bangladesh police can legitimately and impartially conduct investigations into its own members.
The alleged killing of Korban Ali, a day labourer, on March 1 in the Sonaimuri subdistrict by a team of police officers and Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) personnel has garnered media and judicial attention. According to Ali’s father, his son was shot in the head from a van while returning from a local mosque. The list of 10 accused persons includes a senior police officer - the deputy inspector general of the Chittagong range police in Noakhali.
Taking cognisance of the case, a Noakhali court directed the officer-in-charge of Sonaimuri Police Station to investigate the allegation and submit a report on May 15.
The obvious question that arises is whether a police officer or the broader police organisation, whose members have allegedly engaged in wrongdoing, should be the very same organisation charged with the responsibility to investigate that wrongdoing. Citizens in a democratic society have every right to expect that police misconduct is investigated credibly and transparently.
Although police officers possess investigative skills and understand the dynamics of police organisations, they are inherently conflicted when called upon to investigate wrongdoing by one of their own. Even in the absence of any real bias, the public may perceive that a conflict of interest exists and conclude that the insular police institution - the “brotherhood” - will seek to protect itself.
This conflict can also arise where an internal investigation finds a police officer guilty of wrongdoing. In that case, it might appear to the public that the decision arose from the institution’s wish to save face or maintain a certain image. In both cases, a conflict of interest arises - if not actual, then at least perceived.
There are currently two non-judicial oversight mechanisms - internal and external.
The importance of an internal system in holding the police to account has long been recognised. Such a system helps to foster managerial authority, an internal culture of accountability and respect for laws within a police organisation. In Bangladesh, this role is performed by the Police Internal Oversight Unit (PIO), which is fully responsible for the intake, investigation, adjudication and administration of police transgressions. However, it suffers from the same weaknesses that beset internal oversight across police organisations. There is little transparency in its functioning and the complainant has no role in the inquiry process. No matter how hard or long one might search, information as to how internal disciplinary procedures are triggered, function and come to a conclusion are not publicly available.
Anecdotally, one hears that the process is long and arduous, that complainants are intimidated and that there is no due process for officers subject to an investigation.
That is not to deny the efficacy of internal police disciplinary procedures. Accused of being corrupt, under-resourced and insufficiently independent, the PIO has failed to appropriately investigate potential police wrongdoing.
A key component of true accountability of the police is external civilian oversight. External oversight complements internal and judicial accountability and creates a web of accountability that ensures police misconduct is dealt with. The advantages of external accountability over pure self-regulation are clear enough, but in Bangladesh the external oversight mechanism - the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) - is rendered impotent when it comes to holding the police to account.
Section 18 of the National Human Rights Commission Act 2009 does not permit the Commission to actually investigate allegations of violations against “the disciplined force.” Ironically, this phrase includes the police. The most the NHRC can do is to request investigation reports from the Ministry of Home Affairs, which oversees the police. There is, of course, no specific consequence for the failure of the ministry to provide an investigation report. Unsurprisingly, the ministry has not responded in the majority of cases. As such, even the ostensibly independent NHRC is reduced to relying on the police investigating itself, or at least requesting as much.
With weak internal accountability mechanisms and external accountability lacking apparent powers, a culture of impunity has developed. Only a well-resourced and sufficiently independent body that is not liable to inherent bias can conduct credible investigations into police misconduct and restore a culture of respect for the law within the police organisation. In its absence, the truth of the killing of Korban Ali and hundreds of similar incidents seems likely to remain within the confines of a police van - unknown, unchecked and undisciplined.
The writer is a Programme Officer, Police Reforms Programme, at the Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative.
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